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Abstract In recent years, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has
played an important role in disaster risk reduction (DRR)
investment decisions, and now increasing attention is being
paid to its application in developing countries. This article
discusses government investment choices in DRR against
typhoon disasters in Shenzhen, China. While the existing
literature mainly focuses on disaster mitigation measures
such as structural retrofitting, this study proposes a holistic
framework of DRR investments in which structural
(windproof retrofitting) and financial (insurance premium
subsidies and post-disaster relief) are all taken into account.
In particular, intermeasure spillover effects are measured
and used in CBA. The results show that insurance premium
subsidies yield the highest benefit-cost ratio and should be
prioritized in investment. Windproof retrofitting comes in
second place in terms of the benefit-cost ratio and can be
considered when there is a sufficient budget. These results
further confirm the need of a holistic review of government
DRR investments to derive policy recommendations, while
challenges remain in relation to the probabilistic modeling
capacity to support CBA.
Keywords Cost-benefit analysis  Disaster risk reduction
investment  Shenzhen  Typhoon risk model
1 Introduction
In recent years, the increasing frequency and intensity of
extreme weather and climate events (IPCC 2012), together
with the concentration of social assets in risk-prone regions
under ad hoc and inappropriate land use planning
(UNISDR 2015a), have contributed to rising human and
economic costs from natural disasters. Because no single
stakeholder or instrument can handle the problem of nat-
ural disaster risk alone, integrated safety nets with close
partnerships among the public sector, the private sector,
international financial institutions, and nongovernmental
organizations are called for (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mech-
ler 2007). As one of the critical components in the safety
net, governments are indispensable in disaster risk reduc-
tion (DRR) through their roles in providing infrastructure
and public services (Shi, P.J. 2012), and because of their
semi-neutral risk preferences (Arrow and Lind 1970;
Gollier 2004; Mechler and Hochrainer-Stigler 2014) and
advantageous position in allocating resources compared
with the private sector. In addition, their sovereign credit
power enables governments, particularly those with larger
territory and financial resilience, to spread risks spatially
and smooth shocks over longer time periods (Ye et al.
2013). The critical question for governments is how public
funding can be applied most efficiently to reduce disaster
risks.
In the literature, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been
employed extensively in analyzing the cost-effectiveness
of DRR investments. Studies have mainly focused on
structural mitigation measures, particularly earthquake
retrofitting, and mostly for developed countries (Nuti and
Vanzi 2003; Jonkman et al. 2004; Padgett et al. 2010; Li
2012; Liel and Deierlein 2013). The literature suggests that
the benefits of hazard mitigation should be measured in
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terms of losses avoided, that is, those losses that would
have occurred had the measures not been put into place
(World Bank 2014). Those benefits generally include
reducing direct property damage and fatalities, and some-
times indirect impacts such as reducing business interrup-
tions (Rose et al. 2007). As a typical financial appraisal,
CBA converts all benefits and costs into monetary units,
and uses the net present value, benefit-cost ratio (B/C), or
internal rate of return (Kull et al. 2013) to indicate the cost-
effectiveness of the DRR measures under discussion. Many
of the analyses in developed countries and international
community-supported projects in less-developed countries
have provided convincing evidence of the value of
investing in proactive risk management using mitigation
and ex ante financing instruments (Mechler 2005; Rose
et al. 2007; Wethli 2013).
There are two recent trends in the CBA of DRR
investments. First, research focus has gradually turned to
the needs of developing countries (Mechler 2005; Kull
et al. 2013; Michel-Kerjan et al. 2013). These countries
still tend to spend much more on coping (for example,
emergency response, relief, and reconstruction) than on
preparations to reduce vulnerability and exposure to future
losses (World Bank/United Nations 2010). The govern-
ments of these countries may be convinced to prioritize
preparations when strong evidence from CBA is provided.
Second, probabilistic risk models are playing an increas-
ingly important role in estimating benefits and costs. The
costs of preparing for risks are immediate and must be
incurred predominantly up front while the benefits, even if
substantial, tend to accrue over time, are less visible, and
are therefore more uncertain (World Bank 2014). The
nature of uncertain future losses (and therefore the benefits
of DRR investments) requires that CBA has to be proba-
bilistic, and evaluations rely heavily on a set of ‘‘what if’’
scenarios (Rose et al. 2007; Michel-Kerjan et al. 2013). In
response, quantitative catastrophe risk models that provide
probabilistic risk metrics results and loss exceedance
probability curves play critical roles.
A government’s DRR investment options are not limited
to mitigation or prevention measures. Cost-benefit analysis
should shift its emphasis from infrastructure-based options
to soft resilience options (Mechler 2016). Decisions on the
use of limited public funds for DRR essentially relate to the
costs and benefits of various DRR instruments and their
interactions (Freeman et al. 2003). For instance, govern-
ments need to find a balance between disaster mitigation/
prevention that truly diminishes risk (by reducing either the
probability or the loss amount) and risk financing that
enables risk sharing among stakeholders (Kobayashi and
Yokomatsu 2000; Mechler et al. 2010). Then, the question
arises as to which specific structural mitigation measures
should be used, an issue that has been explored extensively
in many of the case studies mentioned above. With regard
to risk financing, there is also the question of how much ex
ante financing should be arranged, and how much should
be left for ex post funding through diversion of resources
from other projects and funds from international donors
(Mahul and Eugene 2006; see also IIASA’s CATSIM
model in Hochrainer-Stigler et al. 2015). Because gov-
ernment investment differs substantially by economy,
institution, and social norms, a holistic framework must be
developed that pays particular attention to the interactions
among DRR measures.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the optimal
choices of government investment in DRR when structural
and nonstructural (financial) measures are all taken into
account, and show the importance of considering the
interaction and spillover effects between structural and
financial measures. Shenzhen, a typical typhoon-prone and
economically developed city on the southeast coast of
China, was used for the case study. Government investment
in windproof retrofitting, premium subsidies for typhoon
damage insurance, and post-typhoon relief were used as the
major DRR measures in the analysis. A typhoon risk model
with stochastic typhoon events was employed to derive
quantitative risk metrics and calculate the cost-effective-
ness of various investments. Section 2 introduces the pre-
sent structure of Chinese government investments in DRR
by department, and depicts the trade-offs and synergies
between different DRR measures. Section 3 provides the
CBA for Shenzhen using a typhoon risk model. Section 4
concludes with a discussion of the results.
2 Chinese Government Investments in DRR
There are several key areas of substantial government
investment in DRR. These investments can be grouped
according to the time horizon of disasters, by preparing
versus coping stages (World Bank 2014), or by prepared-
ness, emergency response, recovery, and reconstruction
stages (Carter 2008). Alternatively, investments can be
grouped by government departments. In China, four key
government functions are involved in DRR spending:
providing disaster prevention, encouraging risk transfer,
providing emergency management, and providing post-
disaster relief (Shi 2005) (Fig. 1).
2.1 Providing Mitigation/Prevention
In the Chinese context, prevention in relation to DRR
refers to structural mitigation measures that lower the
physical vulnerability of buildings and reduce direct
property damage and loss of life. Prevention includes
investment in retrofitting existing buildings and providing
124 Ye et al. Government Investment in DRR
123
prevention infrastructure such as dams or dikes. The pro-
vision of prevention measures is carried out by many
government departments in China, including those
responsible for urban and rural planning, agriculture and
forestry, water resources, land resources, and oceans and
meteorology. The related annual expenditure is substantial.
According to incomplete statistics, from 2010 to 2013,
Chinese central government expenditure in these areas
increased from RMB 376.7 to 640.7 billion Yuan1 (Wu
2015).
The benefits of investing in prevention include the direct
damage avoided, lives saved, and reduced indirect impacts
(Liel and Deierlein 2013). The extent of damage avoided
can be measured by the difference in loss exceedance
curves, with/without the prevention investment, using
probabilistic risk models (Michel-Kerjan et al. 2013),
converted into present values discounted for a given time
horizon (prevention measures can function for decades). A
prevention approach is particularly cost-effective against
frequent but small-scale events (Mechler et al. 2010), while
for well-reinforced buildings/regions, the benefits are less
likely to outweigh the costs.
2.2 Encouraging Disaster Insurance
The Chinese government has been trying to cultivate the
disaster insurance market through intervention. During the
period 2007–2013, the government spent RMB 44.8 billion
Yuan in subsidizing agricultural insurance, providing up to
80 % of the total premiums paid by farmers (Wang et al.
2011). The annual expenditure on crop insurance subsidies
is currently 0.15 % of the annual expenditure for all levels
of government. The initiative of the Chinese government,
as suggested in some of the literature (Coble and Barnett
2012), plays a critical role in maintaining a reasonable
insurance participation level (Liu et al. 2013). The Chinese
government is likely to use a similar strategy to provide
government subsidies for insurance premiums in other
natural disaster insurance lines, although it remains con-
troversial whether the government subsidies provide the
right incentive for individuals’ disaster risk management
(Goodwin and Smith 2013). Recent signs of this trend
include the catastrophe insurance program launched in
Shenzhen in 2014 (China Insurance Regulatory Commis-
sion 2014).
As suggested by the theory of insurance demand, the
direct effect of government subsidies is to allow cheaper
out-of-pocket premiums to encourage voluntary participa-
tion (Coble and Barnett 2012). Consequently, more direct
losses can be insured. The benefit of premium subsidies is
their effect in promoting insurance coverage, together with
their effect on income transfer. The effect of premium
subsidies has a diminishing margin, while the cost is
marginally increasing (Glauber 2004). Other risk transfer
instruments, such as reserve funds, contingent debt, and
Fig. 1 General framework for
government investment in
disaster risk reduction in China.
Source The authors
1 1 USD = RMB 6.5 Yuan (approximately).
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catastrophe bonds, are less likely to enter mainstream
practice in China and are not discussed in our model.
2.3 Emergency Management
Since the 2008 snowstorm disaster in southern China, the
Chinese government has increasingly emphasized the role
of emergency management, that is, the initial response and
coping during the emergency stage of a disaster. Emer-
gency response plans have been developed for all levels of
Chinese government. Once a state of emergency has been
declared, according to those plans, the government shall
mobilize all possible resources to reduce the direct damage
caused by the disaster and the indirect impacts due to
damage to physical assets and disrupted socioeconomic
life. Emergency management in China is quite costly. After
the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, the Chinese central gov-
ernment spent RMB 19.1 billion Yuan during the first
month, while the five affected provincial governments
spent a total of RMB 18.5 billion Yuan.
The evaluation of the benefits of emergency manage-
ment is not as straightforward as that of other investment
lines. Similar to the case of prevention, the benefits are
equivalent to the extra losses should the emergency actions
not be put into practice, while most of the present risk
models are incapable of incorporating a response module.
2.4 Post-Disaster Relief
Post-disaster relief is one of the most conventional forms of
government support for people affected by disasters all
around the world. According to the Natural Disaster Relief
Regulation (State Council of the People’s Republic of
China 2009), the Chinese central government is responsible
for providing a daily allowance to disaster-affected people
for up to 3 months once any level of natural disaster
emergency response is announced by the National Disaster
Reduction Committee of China. There are also funds for
collapsed buildings (RMB 10,000 Yuan/household) and
damaged buildings (RMB 1000 Yuan/household). Specific
relief criteria vary by hazard and region. The Chinese
central government spent an average of RMB 11.5 billion
Yuan in disaster relief, around 0.2 % of total expenditure
each year during 1980–2010 (Ministry of Civil Affairs of
China 2012). Of this expenditure, 55 % were used for daily
allowances during emergency periods, 24 % for collapsed
and damaged buildings, and the rest was used for recovery
of people’s livelihoods.
Disaster relief can be regarded as a special type of loss
transfer. As long as the government provides aid to affected
people, part of their loss is borne by the government. The
benefit from the point of view of the affected people is
purely the aid provided by the government, which equals
the cost to the government of providing that aid, assuming
that there are no transaction costs.
2.5 Trade-offs and Synergy Among Fiscal
Expenditure Lines
All the fiscal expenditure lines mentioned above com-
prise the total investment budget, and their effects are
not independent. It is important to take possible mutual
benefits into account in the development of an optimal
strategy (Fig. 1). For instance, investment in prevention
measures can reduce the probability of events, as well as
losses over different return periods. The reduced risk can
immediately reduce premium rates, and achieve similar
benefits to providing premium subsidies (Kleindorfer and
Kunreuther 1999). Better reinforced buildings will also
reduce government inputs during a state of emergency.
The amount of relief required following a disaster will be
smaller, as the direct losses are likely to be smaller.
Therefore, when applying CBA, the spillover effects
must be taken into account in a holistic perspective.
3 Case Study of DRR Investment for Shenzhen
Typhoon Disaster
In order to show the trade-offs and synergies between
different DRR measures, a case study was carried out in
Shenzhen City regarding typhoon disaster risk reduction.
Using a typhoon risk model, cost-effectiveness of various
investment scenarios was calculated based on quantitative
risk metrics. Policy recommendations were then derived
according to the CBA results.
3.1 Typhoon Disasters in Shenzhen
The city of Shenzhen lies on the southeast coast of China,
between longitudes 113460 and 114370E and latitudes
22270 and 22520N, and comprises a total area of
1952.84 km2 (Fig. 2). Shenzhen was one of the first
special economic regions in China, and has experienced
rapid population (mainly migrants) and economic growth
since the late 1970s. Today it is regarded as one of the
megacities of China, together with Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou.
Shenzhen has a tropical monsoon climate, and
typhoons are one of the most frequent and severe forms
of natural disaster. On average, Shenzhen experiences
four or five typhoons each year (Shi 2003, 2011). During
the period 2000–2007, losses as a result of typhoon dis-
asters accounted for one-third of all losses caused by
hydrometeorological disasters in Shenzhen (Wu and Li
2009).
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3.2 Quantitative Typhoon Risk Assessment
State-of-the-art typhoon risk modeling was employed in
quantitative risk assessment, which involved three critical
components: typhoon hazard as stochastically simulated
typhoon wind speed, exposure of buildings in Shenzhen
city, and quantitative vulnerability (loss) functions of
building damage caused by different wind speeds.
3.2.1 The Typhoon Hazard Model
The parametric typhoon hazard model developed by Bei-
jing Normal University (BNU) (Lin and Fang 2013; Li
et al. 2014; Shi and Fang 2015) was employed in this study.
This includes two important submodules. The typhoon
track module contains both historical typhoon tracks in the
northwest Pacific (China Meteorological Administration
best-track dataset) and a set of stochastic typhoon event
tracks generated from historical data using the Monte Carlo
simulation approach (Shi, X.W. 2012) (Fig. 2). The
stochastic typhoon event set contains 33,012 events in
1000 years of repetition. These datasets provide critical
parameters for every 6-h interval, including the location of
the typhoon center, central minimum pressure, maximum
wind speed, and the radius of the maximum wind speed.
The typhoon wind field module generates typhoon-life-
time maximum 5-s gust wind speed for each 1-km grid
based on a parametric wind field model (Vickery, Skerjl,
and Twisdale 2000; Vickery et al. 2000; Lin 2014). The
parametric model calculates the gradient wind field based
on the input parameters mentioned above, and then con-
verts wind speed to that at a height of 10 m after taking
into account the roughness of the land surface.
3.2.2 Exposure
Exposure data for buildings in Shenzhen were provided by
the Shenzhen City Real Estate Assessment and Develop-
ment Center. Because detailed spatial distribution data for
structure type and occupation information were not avail-
able for public use, statistical data for six districts of
Shenzhen were obtained. For each district, building area
(m2) by subcategory was derived based on cross-tables of
construction (steel, reinforced concrete, composite
masonry,2 brick-wood, and miscellaneous), occupation
(industrial, residential, commercial, public, and other), and
Fig. 2 Simulated stochastic typhoon tracks for China and the location of Shenzhen
2 In China, the composite masonry construction type generally refers
to reinforced masonry bearing walls with precast concrete diaphragms
or to concrete frames with unreinforced masonry infill walls.
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number of stories (2, 5, and 10). The cross-table results are
shown in Table 1.
Economic losses caused by typhoon damage to build-
ings essentially includes structure loss and inventory loss.
In risk modeling, replacement cost is generally used for
structure loss. As the specific replacement costs for Shen-
zhen city are not available for public use, a synthesis of
official replacement costs from several large cities in China
including Suzhou, Hangzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, and
Beijing were used. For each subcategory of buildings, the
highest replacement cost from all five cities was selected.
This yields the hypothetical replacement cost valuation
table for the present study (Table 2). Because data for
value of contents of buildings were not available loss of
inventory was not taken into account in the model.
3.2.3 Vulnerability: Hazards U.S.-MultiHazard Hurricane
Loss Function
Loss functions from the Hazards U.S.-MultiHazard
(HAZUS MH) hurricane model were used in this study to
provide a quantitative description of building vulnerability
to typhoons due to the unavailability of such critical
information in China. The loss function generally uses
logistic-type curves to determine the hurricane peak gust
wind speed-to-building loss ratio. In the HAZUS MH
hurricane model, buildings are divided into subcategories
by construction, occupation, roof shape, material, structure,
and window design (HAZUS MH 2.1 User Manual/Tech-
nical Manual). The HAZUS building categories are based
on U.S. standards, so a perfect correlation between these
and the types of buildings in Shenzhen is not possible. As a
compromise, we use the loss functions for masonry,
masonry-engineered, concrete, steel, and wood in the
HAZUS manual for construction types of brick-wood,
composite masonry, reinforced concrete, steel, and mis-
cellaneous in Shenzhen, assuming that the buildings share
similar occupation types and numbers of stories.
3.2.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Typhoon-
Induced Building Damage and Losses
Maximum gust wind speeds (hereafter ‘‘wind speed’’) for
each 1-km grid and each of the events in the stochastic
typhoon set were then generated by the BNU typhoon
hazard model. Given the lack of data for the spatial dis-
tribution of hazard intensity in relation to exposure, the
median wind speed of all grids within each of the districts
of Shenzhen was taken as the final input representing
hazard intensity. Simulated maximum gust wind speeds
were brought into loss functions of specific building types
to derive event loss records, including physical damage
(m2), and associated economic losses (RMB Yuan)
measured with replacement costs. Event damages and
losses where aggregated on an annual basis to derive the
annual aggregate loss of the simulated 1000 years. Loss
exceedance probability (%) and return period losses of
damage ratio (physical damage/total area exposed), build-
ing damage (m2), and economic losses (RMB Yuan) are
then derived (Fig. 3).
Figure 3 shows the annual building damage ratio,
damage, and economic losses of the exceedance probability
0.1–10 % (return periods of 1/1000a–1/10a, respectively).
Figure 3a, building damage ratio, reflects the comprehen-
sive vulnerability of construction types to wind damage. At
all return periods, Misc. building exhibits the highest
damage ratio, brick-wood comes second, while reinforced
concrete building is the least vulnerable. Figure 3b takes
both vulnerability and exposure into account. Composite
masonry building, although its vulnerability is moderate
among all construction types, shows the largest area
damaged because this is the major construction type in
Shenzhen. Annual damage to brick-wood building was
smaller than composite masonry building due to its limited
exposure, although it is much less wind-resistant than
composite masonry building. Misc. building damage was
too small even to be observed in the figure for the same
reason. Figure 3c, building economic losses, shows the
economic losses measured with the replacement costs of
each construction type, with a similar pattern to building
damage due to the large difference in exposure.
3.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of DRR Investment
Three major DRR measures were considered in our CBA:
wind-proof retrofitting, premium subsidy to typhoon
insurance, and post-disaster relief. Emergency response
was not taken into account due to the lack of capability in
modeling indirect impacts of delayed response. The gov-
ernment is assumed to be the funder of these DRR mea-
sures. Therefore, the CBA was from the viewpoint of the
government.
3.3.1 Effects of Structure Retrofitting Measures
To accommodate the inherent ‘‘what if’’ feature of the
analysis, three different scenarios of building retrofitting
were considered in the simulation (Table 3). These sce-
narios were designed by simply upgrading construction
types of higher vulnerability to those of lower vulnerabil-
ity. For instance, compared to the status quo (the ‘‘bench-
mark’’ scenario), scenario I simply assumes that all
buildings with a construction type of ‘‘miscellaneous’’ or
‘‘brick-wood’’ were retrofitted or upgraded so that their
vulnerability decreased to that of ‘‘composite masonry,’’
while the occupation and number of stories remained
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unchanged. Scenario II provides for extra retrofitting based
on scenario I by upgrading all original composite masonry
structures to reinforced concrete ones. Scenario III assumes
that all miscellaneous, brick-wood, and composite masonry
buildings are retrofitted so that they are as resistant as
reinforced concrete buildings.
The various scenarios are a simple switch of construc-
tion types. However, this guarantees the use of existing loss
functions to determine building losses based on wind speed
inputs. While the basic scenarios here are adequate for an
illustrative case, they are flexible, and can be expanded to
accommodate more realistic and complicated possibilities
once a better description of the type of exposure becomes
available.
When measuring the costs of retrofitting, only the direct
cost was considered. Two retrofitting cost scenarios were
considered. Cost scenario A assumed that the cost of
changing one construction type to another is exactly the
difference in replacement costs. This setting of the
replacement cost parameter is exceptional in common CBA
but it did provide the worst-case scenario of retrofitting
cost (the most expensive case). Cost scenario B assumed
retrofitting cost to be 30 % of the difference in replacement
costs. It is more realistic than A according to various
results (Liu et al. 2015), although still a rough approxi-
mation due to the lack of local experiment data. All of
these costs are supposed to be borne by the government. As
a result, retrofitting also has an income transfer effect
besides its benefit in reducing wind damages and losses.
The typhoon risk model was run using all three retro-
fitting scenarios and two cost scenarios. Changes in expo-
sure as well as corresponding loss functions yielded
completely different building losses, despite an identical
stochastic typhoon event set. The aggregate physical
damages and economic losses for all scenarios are sum-
marized in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
The simulation results confirm the role of retrofitting
(Table 4). As the overall vulnerability of buildings
decreases by switching from scenario I through to scenario
III, the annual average aggregate physical damage (AAD)
measured by area (m2) decreases. Annual average damage
ratio also drops. As the majority of buildings in Shenzhen
are composite masonry and reinforced concrete, the chan-
ges in AAD and the damage ratio (AAD/AE, AE is total
area exposed) are slight for scenario I. They become large
in scenarios II and III, when upgraded composite masonry
buildings are involved. The largest decline in AAD is
200,500 m2 (from the benchmark to scenario III) and the
loss ratio changes by nearly 0.02 %, which is still modest
due to the already high wind resistance of the composite
masonry buildings.
The results in terms of building losses as measured by
replacement costs are somewhat surprising. When cost
scenario A was assumed, assessed AALs (million Yuan)
indicate that upgrading construction types creates even
higher risk, while the loss rate (AAL/AE) confirms lower
relative loss risk. The difference shows the two inherent
forces that determine the final losses, the change in
Table 1 Exposure to typhoons by construction type in six selected
districts of Shenzhen, China (million m2)
Construction 2-Story 5-Story 10-Story Total
Steel 6.80 8.61 4.44 19.85
Reinforced concrete 88.01 111.43 58.16 257.60
Composite masonry 146.46 307.93 123.23 577.63
Brick-wood 88.01 111.43 58.16 69.58
Miscellaneous 6.80 8.61 4.44 8.40
Table 2 Replacement costs by building type in six districts of Shenzhen, China
Construction Occupation Number of stories Replacement cost (Yuan/m2)
Steel All All 937
Reinforced concrete Industrial 10 1829
Reinforced concrete Residential 10 1623
Reinforced concrete Commercial 10 1623
Reinforced concrete Public 10 1560
Reinforced concrete Others 10, 5 1282
Reinforced concrete All 2 953
Composite masonry All 10 922
Composite masonry All 5 750
Composite masonry All 2 582
Brick-wood All 10 875
Brick-wood All 5 700
Brick-wood All 2 526
Miscellaneous All All 326
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exposure and the change in vulnerability. Therefore, in
this case, the impact of increased exposure induced by
upgrading construction type outweighed the effect of
reduced overall vulnerability. Consequently, both slight
increases in the absolute value of AAL and modest
decreases in the AAD ratio are observed. By contrast,
retrofitting yields positive effects when cost scenario B
was assumed.
The effect of retrofitting on saving lives has been
considered and estimated in the literature. In this study, a
rigorous quantitative estimation was not possible due to
the limited modeling capacity of our typhoon risk model.
Instead, a coarse estimation was carried out. Historical
data show that the annual average death toll (including
missing persons) in Shenzhen is 3.125 (25 deaths/missing
persons during the period 2000–2007). In several cases,
consideration of the monetary value of lives saved adds
substantially to the benefits of retrofitting (Michel-Kerjan
et al. 2013). After considering a variety of suggested
ranges of values of statistical life (VSLs) presented in the
literature (Viscusi and Aldy 2003; Liel and Deierlein
2013), we used the VSLs of USD 75,000 and 6 million
employed in Michel-Kerjan et al. (2013) as the lower
and upper bounds, respectively. If an optimistic
assumption is used whereby retrofitting can reduce
fatalities by 50 %, the estimated monetary effects of
lives saved would be approximately RMB 0.72 million
Yuan/year and RMB 58 million Yuan/year, respectively.
However, even using the upper bound, the effect still
does not outweigh the increased economic losses in









































































Fig. 3 Building damage ratio (a), damage (b), and economic losses (c) for buildings in Shenzhen, China using the typhoon risk model
Table 3 Scenarios for retrofitting of buildings in Shenzhen, China
Scenarios Construction type change
I Miscellaneous or brick-wood ? composite masonry
II Miscellaneous or brick-wood ? composite masonry
Composite masonry ? reinforced concrete
III Miscellaneous, brick-wood, and composite
masonry ? reinforced concrete
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Given the simulation results, it is difficult to determine
whether retrofitting is cost-effective. While the reduced
AAD and damage ratios can bring benefits in other areas
such as lower insurance premiums, the final decision
depends on what spillover effects are provided in relation
to other DRR measures.
3.3.2 Effects of Insurance Premium Subsidy
The effects of government subsidies for insurance premi-
ums essentially depend on the response of the public to this
form of intervention. Generally, premium subsidies will
encourage more people to participate in an insurance pro-
gram, and therefore more insurance coverage and protec-
tion is provided by the private sector (Glauber 2004). More
insurance coverage purchased means that more losses can
be indemnified by insurance (the ‘‘insured loss’’), and
therefore more risks are transferred. Therefore, the expec-
ted value of the extra insured loss can be used as a measure
of the effect achieved.
In order to measure the effects of premium subsidies, it
is necessary to understand insurance demand in response to
subsidy rate as well as insurance coverage and premium
rate changes. In insurance demand analysis, the literature
uses participation probability to quantify insurance demand
as an alternative to a ‘‘take-it-or-leave-it’’ question (di-
chotomous ‘‘yes/no’’ decision) (Sherrick et al. 2004; Hu
et al. 2009). The probability that a person purchase a
specific insurance product in such a context can be defined
as Pr parð Þ ¼ exp b0x= 1þ exp b0xð Þ, in which x is a vector
of factors affecting insurance choice and b is a vector of
associated coefficients describing the marginal effects. x
could be either sociodemographic variables or insurance
product attributes. In the present case, we are interested in
how participation probability will change in response to
three elements: premium changes induced by premium
subsidies provided by the government, coverage changes
due to retrofitting, and premium rate changes due to ret-
rofitting. Retrofitting buildings will lead to smaller pre-
mium rates as the actuarially fair premium rate is exactly
the AAD ratio (Table 4). Therefore, insurance product
attributes x¼ C; r; pf g are considered, in which C is
insurance coverage, assumed to be the replacement cost for
each type of building, r is government subsidy rate, and p
is the actuarially fair premium rate (equivalent of the AAD
ratio in Table 4). We can rearrange the equation using
x¼ C; r; pf g, in which p ¼ C  p  1 rð Þ is the total out-
of-pocket premium paid by the policyholder.
Estimating coefficients in the logit probability when x are
insurance attributes involves choice experiment analysis.
While the estimation of these coefficients requires a soundly
designed and well-implemented survey of insurance pur-
chasers, this is not feasible in Shenzhen because of the
complete lack of typhoon insurance. As a result, coefficients
estimated from an existing choice experiment analysis,
although applied in other regions and to other insurance
products in China, were employed (Liu et al. 2013). The
coefficient vector is bC ¼ 0:003; br ¼ 0:008;bp ¼ 0:050.
Table 4 Typhoon damage to buildings in Shenzhen, China
Scenario Building damage (million m2) AAD ratioa (%)
Annual average damage (AAD) 1/20a 1/50a 1/100a 1/250a
Benchmark 0.893 3.29 5.98 8.30 13.94 0.0957
I 0.888 3.25 5.88 8.16 13.68 0.0951
II 0.733 2.96 4.99 6.95 11.15 0.0786
III 0.717 2.88 4.81 6.63 10.57 0.0768
a Corresponding total area exposed is 933.06 million m2
Table 5 Building losses measured by replacement costs (million Yuan) in Shenzhen, China
Scenariosa Value exposed Annual average
loss (AAL)
Reduced AAL Retrofitting cost
Benchmark 789,821.00 754.97 – –
I-A 796,601.41 757.17 -2.48 6780.31
II-A 1,082,114.68 849.33 -106.71 292,293.58
III-A 1,121,030.60 860.96 -119.86 331,209.50
I-B 792,081.20 752.85 2.85 2260.10
II-B 887,252.30 697.31 58.39 97,431.19
III-B 900,224.27 691.39 64.32 110,403.17
a Scenario I-A refers to the retrofitting scenario I together with cost scenario A, and so on
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In this subsidy scheme, the participation probability
Pr C; r; pð Þwill increase if a higher insurance coverageC or a
higher subsidy rate r is provided, or if premiums p fall. The
cost of the government subsidy is the aggregate subsidy
expenditure, which is the total area insured AE  Pr C; r; pð Þ
multiplied by the subsidy per unit of area p  r. The expected
value of the extra insured losses can be measured with the




Pr Cc;s; r; pc;s




in which subscript c denotes different construction types,
subscript s denotes different prevention scenarios listed in
the first column of Table 5, and s = 0 denotes the bench-
mark scenario. The difference between the expected losses
covered by insurance measures the influence of lower out-
of-pocket premiums paid by policyholders, which is a joint
effect of premium subsidies and retrofitting. The contri-
bution of premium subsidies given any prevention scenario
is EDIL rjC; pð Þ. The contribution of retrofitting is related
to scenario-specific insurance coverage measured as
replacement costs (retrofitting costs included) and scenar-
io-specific fair premium rates, EDIL C; pjrð Þ.
Given all the values of C (insurance coverage, replace-
ment costs in Table 2 and value exposed in Table 5) and p
(premium rates, that is, the damage rates shown in Table 4,
no risk loading and transaction costs are considered) asso-
ciatedwith each construction type c under different scenarios
s, the extra expected insured loss EDIL can be derived.
Figure 4 shows the results. Figure 4a depicts the overall
extra expected insured losses in response to premium subsidy
rate by scenario and Fig. 4b depicts the ratio of effect (extra
expected insurance loss) to total subsidy cost in response to
premium subsidy costs. As premium subsidy involves
income transfer effect, adding 1 to the effect-cost ratio will
lead to the measure of overall benefit-cost ratio.
The simulated results confirm the positive effect of pre-
mium subsidies in providing extra insurance coverage, and
consequently more losses will be insured. The results of
scenarios of I-A and I-B are extremely close to the bench-
mark case, as both scenarios induce very limited change in
both exposure and premium rates (Table 5). For each ret-
rofitting scenario (I, II, and III), the pair of curves of theAand
B cost scenarios are parallel to each other, as each pair shares
identical p. The vertical difference between each pair of the
curves (for example, II-A vs. II-B) are of total exposure
change induced by coverage increase, or in other words, the
net difference between retrofitting costs assumed in scenar-
ios A and B. All curves show diminishing margins against
subsidy rate. Also, the overall-slope for the benchmark case
is the largest while that of scenario III is the smallest, indi-
cating higher subsidy effects at higher premium rates.
The ratios of extra expected insured loss to total subsidy
cost in Fig. 4b can be used as a measure of the cost-ef-
fectiveness of subsidies, although not taking the income
transfer effect of subsidies into account. All the ratios are
convex curves, indicating positive margins along decreas-
ing curves in response to increasing subsidy rate. The ratios
also show diminishing margin against premium rates. The
ratios for the benchmark case, and scenarios I-A and I-B
that have larger premium rates lie at the top part of the
figure, while ratios for scenario III-A lie at the bottom.
Sudden jumps can be observed on the effect-cost ratio
curves at the subsidy rate of 100 %, when the insurance
premium is completely paid by the government and poli-














































































Fig. 4 Expected losses covered by extra insurance in response to various premium subsidy rates (a) and the ratio of extra expected insured
losses/subsidy cost against premium subsidy rate (b)
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the jump is rooted in the diminishing power of the subsidy
in attracting participation. When the subsidy rate is sub-
stantially high, every percent increase in participation
probability or every Yuan increase in extra insured loss
will cost considerably. It would even be more cost-effec-
tive to just let all households be insured by providing
‘‘free’’ insurance. Consequently, there is a certain range of
subsidy rate being dominated under each scenario in terms
of cost-effectiveness. For instance, in the benchmark case,
the ratio for 100 % subsidy is 0.21. Any subsidy rate larger
than 80 % (the corresponding ratio is 0.21) and smaller
than 100 % should not be considered from the viewpoint of
CBA.
3.3.3 Effect of Disaster Relief
According to the Natural Disaster Relief Regulation (State
Council of the People’s Republic of China 2009), the
government is responsible for providing RMB 10,000
Yuan/household for collapsed buildings. A household is
defined as comprising 100 m2 housing on average, there-
fore this equates to RMB 100 Yuan/m2 for repairs and
reconstruction. The effect of disaster relief is to transfer a
part of the loss to the government. Consequently, the effect
as measured in monetary terms will be identical to the
government’s costs.
Windproof retrofitting measures will, as noted in the
discussion on premium subsidies, have a spillover effect on
relief. As retrofitting measures reduce the level of physical
damage to buildings, annual average relief costs can be
reduced accordingly. The estimated spillover effect can be
derived using the AAD reduced by retrofitting times per
unit area relief cost. Therefore, spillover effects for
scenarios I, II, and III, irrespective of cost scenario, are
RMB 0.50, 15.97, and 17.55 million Yuan, respectively.
3.3.4 Overall Cost-Benefit Analyses and Government
Choices
The optimal decision for the government depends on a
comparison of the costs and benefits of the three different
input approaches indicated above. A summary of the CBA
for three different types of government investment in DRR
is shown in Table 6.
The cost of investment in windproof retrofitting is one-
off, but it can provide benefits for decades, while
assumptions about the valid time horizon of retrofitting
measures can influence benefit estimation (Liel and
Deierlein 2013; Michel-Kerjan et al. 2013). Therefore, the
overall benefit of the retrofitting strategy is the sum of AAL
reduced under each scenario (first column in Table 6), plus
the spillover effects of extra expected insured loss
increased and relief cost reduced (second column in
Table 6), aggregated at present values for a given time
horizon. The discount rate for present value calculations is
the benchmark interest rate announced by the People’s
Bank of China in 2015, which is approximately 5 %. We
considered a 25-year time horizon for discounting, which is
exactly half of the time horizon for land use rights for
commercial buildings in China. Other time horizons were
also applied, but they did not change the pattern of the
results due to the small annual benefits. As all the costs
were assumed to be borne by the government, the retro-
fitting strategy involves an income transfer. In order to
make the results comparable to the case of government
relief, a baseline B/C of 1 is applied.
Table 6 Benefit-cost ratio (B/C) for government DRR investments









rate = 1 %)
Free insurance B/C




Benchmark – – – 1.419 1.210 80 1
I-A -2.48 2.79 1.0007 1.414 1.207 80 1
II-A -106.71 102.83 0.9998 1.231 1.108 84 1
III-A -119.86 96.69 0.9990 1.212 1.098 84 1
I-B 2.85 1.33 1.0274 1.415 1.208 80 1
II-B 58.39 41.80 1.0152 1.286 1.150 77 1
III-B 64.32 45.84 1.0148 1.273 1.124 77 1
a B/Cs for retrofitting are based on the sum of present values over a 25-year time horizon
b The benefits in terms of lives saved are not listed in the table because the results are too coarse
c Equivalent subsidy rate retrieves the critical subsidy rate that exactly has identical B/C to the case of free insurance (subsidy rate = 100 %)
under each scenario. Any subsidy rates between the equivalent subsidy rate and 100 % will lead to B/C lower than the case of free insurance, and
shall never be considered in policy discussion
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For the case of premium subsidy, B/Cs at the smallest
subsidy rate (1 %) and B/Cs at the subsidy rate of 100 %
are both reported. As the B/Cs ‘‘jump up’’ at the rate of
100 %, the critical subsidy rates that exactly yield identical
B/Cs to the case of 100 % subsidy rate are also derived and
reported. As premium subsidies also induce an income
transfer effect, a baseline B/C of 1 is applied, similar to the
results of retrofitting. The benefit in terms of disaster relief
in the context of the present study is purely the loss transfer
to the government, which equals government expenditure.
From a financial viewpoint, only the measures with B/Cs
larger than 1 are cost-effective and worthy of investment.
In this regard, the summary of benefits confirmed the
importance of considering the spillover effects of the ret-
rofitting investment. If 100 % of the difference in
replacement cost was used (cost scenario A), retrofitting is
barely cost-effective. Nevertheless, the spillover effects are
almost large enough even to outweigh the negative impacts
under cost scenario A. The overall B/Cs for scenarios II-A
and III-A are smaller but quite close to the B/C baseline of
1. Then, adding the benefits in terms of lives saved will
guarantee the cost-effectiveness of retrofitting, even in the
case of expensive cost scenario A. If the roughly estimated
annual benefits in terms of lives saved (RMB 0.72–58
million Yuan/year) are used, they are equivalent to benefits
of RMB 11.1–858 million Yuan over a 25-year time per-
iod, similar to the magnitude of the direct effects in sce-
nario III-B. Taking the values into account will allow the
B/Cs of all scenarios be larger than 1. However, the size of
benefits cannot lead to a boost in the overall B/Cs as in
some studies (for example, Michel-Kerjan et al. 2013). As
the largest share of construction type in Shenzhen is
composite masonry, which is substantially windproof, the
retrofitting costs will be significantly higher compared with
the benefits if the income transfer effect is not taken into
account, similar to the findings in other CBAs of earth-
quake retrofitting projects (for example, Liel and Deierlein
2013). Consequently, the B/Cs of retrofitting are always
smaller than those of the insurance premium subsidy in this
study.
The B/Cs for premium subsidies are cost-effective in all
cases, ranging from 1.09 to 1.41. B/Cs across scenarios
indicate that subsidies are more cost-effective when
premiums are higher, which echoes the pattern as in Fig. 4.
Therefore, the effects and B/Cs could be even larger in real
cases than the results reported here—in real cases, the
actual gross premium rates will include catastrophic load-
ings and administrative costs, which could lead to premium
rates 50 % more than the actuarially fair one.
To translate the quantitative results into policy recom-
mendation, the measure with the highest B/C should be
given priority. Therefore, in the case of Shenzhen, gov-
ernment investment in premium subsidies should be
prioritized irrespective of scenarios according to our CBA
results, as long as the B/Cs of premium subsidies are all
larger than those of retrofitting measures. The choice of the
government essentially depends on its budget:
(1) With limited budget, the government should first
spend in subsidizing insurance premium, and use
funding to gradually increase subsidy rate up to 80 %.
No funds should be spent in retrofitting at the
beginning.
(2) If there is still sufficient funding after fulfilling step
(1), the government could choose either to keep
subsidy rate at 80 %, or to provide 100 % subsidy
immediately, as subsidy rate interval (0.8, 1) in the
benchmark scenario was dominated in terms of cost-
effectiveness. The reason has been explained in
Sect. 3.3.2 (see also in Table 6). As both 80 % and
100 % subsidy rates provide identical B/Cs in the
benchmark case, the final choice depends on reasons
other than the financial perspective. One hundred
percent premium subsidy means that the government
will pay the whole insurance premium and all
exposure will be insured. It would be a good choice
if merely considered from the measure of total risk
transferred. It would also incur much less transaction
costs than the case of 80 % subsidy as the premium
collection process would be much simpler. However,
from an economic point of view, full insurance
subsidy is likely to leave the insured unaware of
insurance protection.
(3) If the government still has a sufficient budget after
fulfilling the need in subsidizing insurance premiums,
then retrofitting can be considered. It may first
consider retrofitting the buildings of the most vulner-
able construction type, for example, the miscella-
neous and brick-wood buildings; then retrofitting
composite masonry, which will involve substantial
costs, can be considered.
(4) Last but not the least, when all the ex-ante measures
come into practice, the government can consider
adding funds in post-disaster relief measures, which is
considered as a pure loss transfer to the government.
4 Conclusion
The United Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR 2015b) proposes invest-
ment in disaster prevention and reduction, both public and
private, and through structural and nonstructural measures.
To achieve this, it is important to measure the cost-effec-
tiveness of measures and promote ‘‘the integration of
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disaster risk reduction considerations and measures in
financial and fiscal instruments’’ (UNISDR 2015b, p. 20).
In light of this priority, this study applies CBA to evaluate
and compare government investments in both structural
(windproof retrofitting) and nonstructural (insurance pre-
mium subsidies and disaster relief) approaches. With the
support of quantitative risk modeling, special attention has
been paid to the spillover effects of structural investments,
which have rarely been discussed in previous studies.
Our results provide several important observations.
First, spillover effects are critically important when mea-
suring the overall effectiveness of windproof retrofitting
measures. Because Shenzhen is a region of low vulnera-
bility to typhoon disaster, the direct benefit of retrofitting
could be outweighed by its costs in high-cost scenarios if
its spillover effects to premium subsidy and disaster relief
are not taken into account. In low cost scenarios, the
spillover effects are as large as direct effects of retrofitting
in reduced AAL. This result confirms our focus on the
intermeasure spillover effects in a holistic risk management
framework. Second, our analysis suggests that insurance
premium subsidies should be prioritized for typhoon risk
reduction in Shenzhen. In the case of sufficient funds, the
Shenzhen government can consider retrofitting the most
vulnerable construction types. Disaster relief in our dis-
cussion is purely loss transfer from the affected population
to the government and therefore should be considered last.
Therefore, structural measures are not always the best first
choice in DRR investments.
The research needs to be expanded in several important
aspects before the results and policy recommendations
can be applied in Shenzhen. First, improving the capacity
of the typhoon risk model will enable more detailed
discussion of benefits and costs. For instance, developing
finer-scale distribution of exposure (construction type and
value) can enable a spatially explicit discussion of retro-
fitting measures. Experiments for calibrating damage
function changes in response to more specific retrofitting
measures will also lead to more realistic results than the
present one. It will also be critical to incorporate the
benefits of reduced indirect impacts due to successful
emergency coping such as emergency relocation of people
and rapid post-disaster relief. Second, the CBAs in the
present study, as in the existing literature, were inherently
performed from a financial perspective and within a
framework of partial equilibrium. The costs of govern-
ment investments are all direct monetary costs, while the
opportunity costs, which should be valued within a gen-
eral equilibrium framework, should be taken into account
in further studies.
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